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Abstract Trust plays an important role in both group cooperation and economic exchange.  As new 
technologies emerge for communication and exchange, established mechanisms of trust are disrupted or 
distorted, which can lead to the breakdown of cooperation or to increasing fraud in exchange.  This paper 
examines whether and how personal privacy information about members of distributed work groups 
influences individuals’ cooperation and privacy behavior in the group.  Specifically, we examine whether 
people use others’ privacy settings as signals of trustworthiness that affect group cooperation.  In addition, 
we examine how individual privacy preferences relate to trustworthy behavior.  Understanding how people 
interact with others in online settings, in particular when they have limited information, has important 
implications for geographically distributed groups enabled through new information technologies.  In 
addition, understanding how people might use information gleaned from technology usage, such as 
personal privacy settings, particularly in the absence of other information, has implications for 
understanding many potential situations that arise in pervasive computing environments. 
  
1 Introduction 
 
Trust plays an important role in group cooperation.  During periods of broad social change, however, the 
basis of trust, and therefore the ability for social actors to engage in exchange and cooperation, can be 
disrupted.  For example, during the Industrial Revolution, increased contact and interaction between 
unknown individuals as a result of immigration to cities amplified uncertainty regarding the reliability and 
trustworthiness of potential exchange partners. [1]  Similarly, interaction occurred in new settings and 
situations, e.g., factories, in which individuals’ behavior and outcomes depended on the actions of possibly 
unknown others. [1,2]  Over time, new mechanisms were created to detect, monitor and signal the 
reliability/trustworthiness of social actors. [1,2]  Today, as new information technologies (IT) emerge for 
communication and exchange that facilitate contact between unknown individuals in novel settings and 
situations (e.g., chat rooms, social networking websites, distributed work groups), established mechanisms 
of trust are disrupted or distorted, which can lead to the breakdown of cooperation or to increasing fraud in 
exchange.  Moreover, if new mechanisms for determining or signaling trustworthiness have yet to be 
established, individuals may use other signals as a basis for trust; signals which may or may not be 
associated with reliability yet will affect interaction, exchange and cooperation. 
Interest in the implications of information technology for trust crosses all of the social science 
disciplines. [3-11]  Social scientists, for example, have explored how interpersonal trust is adapted to the 
digital environment [6], e.g., the reputation system of eBay [7] and reliability in the online encyclopedia 
Wikipedia [12]; how trust affects consumer and other behavior online [8,13-15]; and how institutional trust 
is managed in pervasive networks by organizations such as firms. [9,16-17]  In this paper, we build on 
these studies to examine how personal privacy information about members of geographically distributed, 
virtual work groups influences cooperation and privacy behavior in the group.  Specifically, we use 
experimental methods to examine whether people use others’ personal privacy settings as signals of 
trustworthiness within the group that affect cooperative group behavior.  In addition, we examine how 
individual privacy preferences relate to whether individuals cooperate in the group.  Understanding how 
people interact with others in online settings, in particular when they have limited information, has 
important implications for geographically distributed groups enabled through new information 
technologies.  Furthermore, understanding how people might use information gleaned from technology 
usage, such as personal privacy settings, particularly in the absence of other information, has implications 
for understanding many potential situations that arise in pervasive computing environments. 
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In section 2 we briefly discuss the social science literature on trust, as well as previous research on 
trust in work groups, including distributed teams facilitated with IT support.  Section 3 describes the social 
experiment used for the study and the characteristics of the subjects.  Section 4 presents results, while 
section 5 discusses the findings, limitations and implications. 
 
2 Trust, Cooperation and Work Teams 
 
Trust is a term to describe positive expectations of one actor toward another for some specific action.  
When we say that A trusts B, we typically mean that A trusts B to do X [18-19], and so A may take some 
action Y (e.g., lending $10, sharing information, contributing to a joint project) in which A is now 
vulnerable to losing Y depending on the behavior of B (i.e., doing X or not).  According to Edward Lorenz 
[20], A’s behavior Y based on trust in B “consists in action that (1) increases one’s vulnerability to another 
whose behavior is not under one’s control, and (2) takes place in a situation where the penalty suffered if 
the trust is abused would lead one to regret the action.”  Snijders [21] specifies that an actor’s vulnerability 
in trust relationships is based on uncertainty about another actor’s “disposition or preferences” for 
cooperation, not his or her abilities to cooperate. [2, 22-23] 
A’s positive expectations about B, i.e., A’s perception of B’s trustworthiness, may be based on a 
number of different reasons, including: (1) A’s past experience with B in general or on X specifically; (2) 
A’s relationship with B;  (3) A’s knowledge of B’s reputation from other actors; (4) A’s knowledge of B’s 
incentives to do X in response to some other third-party.  Social actors may have very limited information, 
however, about potential exchange partners (B) and therefore have limited grounds on which to assess 
trustworthiness.  Indeed, as noted above, during periods of rapid social change, social actors may have 
much greater contact with unknown others for whom they have limited information.  In such cases of 
limited information, some characteristics or behavior may be perceived by others as signals of 
trustworthiness, regardless of the association between such characteristics and behavior. For example, 
Zucker [1] describes how some actors may perceive characteristics such as race or gender as signals of  
trustworthiness, without the knowledge or intention of the so-characterized actor.   
 
 
3 Methods 
 
We conducted a social experiment in which undergraduate subjects (n=110) participated in a series of 
simulated online groups.  After responding to a recruitment advertisements and completing an Informed 
Consent form approved by our Institutional Review Board, undergraduate student subjects completed a 
brief online pre-survey measuring demographic characteristics, experience in Internet commerce, and 
attitudes toward taking risks. Upon completing the pre-survey, each subject was assigned a numeric 
identifier used to anonymously link the pre-survey responses to the experiment results and post-survey 
responses.  Subjects brought their identification number to a laboratory session where they participated in 
the experiment session that lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
In the laboratory session, subjects were told they were members of geographically distributed 
work teams (with two other individuals not known by the subjects) that were working on developing a 
proprietary product via a secure (password protected) online project wiki.  In addition, the team was in 
competition with other project teams for the best product design, so project development information was 
even more closely guarded than standard proprietary designs.  Given that the project wikis contained 
valuable information, team members were faced with opportunities to sell the password. Subjects made 
decisions about whether to sell the wiki password in a series of six different teams, comprised of different 
types of group members (described further below), with each team engaged in a competition as described.  
Subjects earned points based on the outcomes of each team-competition (other group members are 
simulated so their behavior is determined randomly); points were converted to monetary amounts that 
subjects were paid upon completing the study.  If any team member sold the password, all team members 
received zero points.  If the subject sold the password, s/he was awarded points according to one of two 
randomly assigned conditions: (1) 4 points, which was less than the potential gain from group success 
while protecting the password (6 points) or winning the competition (8 points); or (2) 8 points, which was 
greater than the potential gain from group success while protecting password (6 points) and equal to points 
from winning the competition (8 points).  If the subject chose not to sell the password, s/he was awarded 
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either 0, 6 or 8 points depending on, respectively, if another group member sold the password (20% chance, 
randomly determined), if no member sold the password (70% chance, randomly determined), or if no 
member sold the password and the team won the competition (10% chance, randomly determined). 
For each team, subjects receive two pieces of information about the other group members: (1) 
individual’s privacy setting on a scale of 1 – 3 (1=Private 2=Moderate and 3=Open), and (2) individual’s 
skill level: Low or High.  Subjects were teamed with two (simulated) members and decisions about whether 
to sell the password were made simultaneously with no interaction allowed. In order to reduce the chance 
that feedback about outcomes would influence subjects’ subsequent decisions, subjects were not told the 
number of teams they would participate in, or the outcomes for their teams until the end of the experiment. 
 
 
4 Results 
 
A total of 110 subjects participated in the study, with each subject making choices in 6 rounds (different 
team configurations) to decide whether to sell the password or not (n=110*6 = 660 observations).   
Our central research question is whether subjects use others’ privacy settings as a signal of 
trustworthiness, in particular when they have limited information about group members.  If so, we would 
expect to see that subjects behave differently depending on group members’ privacy settings.  In the 
experimental setting described here, we tested whether subjects were more or less likely to cooperate (not 
sell the group password) depending on other group members’ privacy settings of open, moderate or private, 
and controlling for other factors, including subjects’ own privacy setting (explored further below), group 
members’ skill level, and value of group cooperation (i.e., size of the incentive to sell based on whether 
value of selling password > potential group payoff).   
Table 1 shows the percentage of subjects who were willing to sell the password (not cooperate) 
depending on the privacy settings of teammates, after controlling for the effect of  subjects’ own privacy 
setting, teammates’ skill level, and the value of group cooperation. Subjects were significantly more likely 
to sell the password when paired with a teammate who was more open, and even more likely to sell when 
paired with two teammates who were more open. (P-values based on estimates from logistic regression of 
choice to sell password on teammates’ privacy settings, controlling for subject’s privacy setting, 
teammates’ skill levels, and size of the incentive to sell, with robust standard errors.)  That is, subjects were 
most likely to sell the password when paired with two open teammates, and least likely to sell the password 
when paired with two private teammates.  These findings suggest that subjects do indeed use other’s 
privacy settings as signals of trustworthiness in conditions of limited information, altering their behavior in 
ways that indicate they believe others who have more open settings are less trustworthy. 
 
 
Table 1. Percent willing to sell password by team members’ privacy settings 
 
Teammate 1: Privacy Setting  
Teammate 2: 
Privacy Setting 
 
OPEN 
 
MODERATE 
 
PRIVATE 
 
 
P-value 
 
OPEN 
 
58% 
 
45% 
 
--- 
Teammate 1 
P<.001 
 
MODERATE 
 
--- 
 
39% 
 
--- 
 
PRIVATE 
 
46% 
 
34% 
 
24% 
 
Teammate 2 
P<.001 
Note: P-values based on estimates from logistic regression of choice to sell password on teammates’ 
privacy settings, controlling for subject’s privacy setting, teammates’ skill levels, and size of the incentive 
to sell, with robust standard errors. 
 
 These findings raise the question as to whether individuals who are more open are indeed less 
trustworthy, i.e., are subjects with open privacy settings more likely to sell the group password than those 
with more private settings?  Table 2 shows the mean differences (unadjusted) in likelihood of selling the 
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password between subjects with different privacy settings.  In contrast to the findings above, subjects who 
are more private are somewhat more likely to sell the password (p<.10) than subjects who are open.   
 
Table 2. Percent willing to sell password by subject’s privacy setting 
 
Subject’s 
Privacy Setting 
 
% willing to sell password 
 
ANOVA 
 
Private 
 
48 
 
Moderate 
 
40 
 
F = 2.56 
P<.10 
 
 
Open 
 
36 
 
Bonferroni  
Private > Open 
P<.10 
 
 We examine this finding further in Figure 1, which shows the interaction between subject’s 
privacy setting (comparing only Open with Private, suppressing Moderate category) and Teammates’ 
privacy settings (comparing only teams in which teammates are either both Open or both Private). 
Consistent with the findings in Table 1, Figure 1 shows that all subjects are less likely to cooperate with 
open teammates than with private teammates.  Surprisingly, however, when faced with two private 
teammates, private subjects are less likely to cooperate than open subjects.  These preliminary findings 
suggest that though all subjects appear to cooperate more with private teammates, private subjects are least 
likely to actually cooperate! 
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Figure 1. Percent willing to sell password by interaction of Subject privacy setting with teammates’ 
privacy settings 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Teammates Open Teammates Private
Open Private
%
 W
ill
in
g 
to
 s
el
l p
as
sw
or
d
Subject Privacy Preferences
%
 W
ill
in
g 
to
 s
el
l p
as
sw
or
d
 
 
 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Trust in groups is affected by the privacy preferences of other members of the group; those with more 
private settings are more likely to be viewed as trustworthy, and therefore to be trusted.  Users’ own 
privacy preferences also appear to matter for trust; more private users appear to be less trustworthy with 
regard to protecting group privacy and/or to be more distrustful of others than are users with more open 
settings. 
 
Users will use privacy settings as “signals” of trustworthy behavior in groups, but those signals are not 
necessarily accurately associated with trustworthy behavior.  Managing privacy in online groups or the 
“commons” enabled by new information technologies may be more difficult than expected, as it does not 
appear to be a simple aggregate of individual preferences or behavior.  In short, social dynamics and social 
context are likely to matter as much (or more) for ensuring privacy and security than technology alone. 
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